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OFFICE OF COLLECTION AND DISSEMINATION

15 October 1946

MEMORANDUM FOR THE EXECUTIVE TO THE DIRECTOR:

Through: Assistant Director for Collection and Dissemination.

SUBJECT: Proposed CIG Administrative Order, subject: Policy on Clearance of Personnel for Duties with the Central Intelligence Group.

[Handwritten signature]

1. The undersigned concurs in the recommendation contained in paragraph 1(c) of the memorandum from the Acting Assistant Director for Special Operations, dated 10 October 1946, subject as above.

2. The undersigned does not concur in the recommendations contained in paragraph 1(a) and (b) of the memorandum cited in the foregoing paragraph.

a. With reference to recommendation (paragraph 1(a)), it is believed that the retention of the words "native-born" is essential if high standards of personnel security are to be maintained in the selection of the staff and clerical personnel of the Central Intelligence Group. Paragraph 9 of the subject proposed administrative order permits exceptions to the "native-born" requirement. The Operations Memorandum being prepared by the Security Division, Office of the Executive for Personnel and Administration, will explain in detail the manner in which exemptions may be requested by Assistant Directors or their equivalents. Obviously, this requirement is not applicable to agent, sub-agent, informant and similar field operating personnel--the manner of their security screening will be delegated in the pending Operations Memorandum to the appropriate Assistant Director. It is further believed that all member Departments, without exception, may object to the elimination of the "native-born" requirement. Furthermore, the security prestige of the Central Intelligence Group will be greatly enhanced in the eyes of intelligence personnel if this provision is retained.

b. With reference to the recommendation (paragraph 1(b)), it is believed that recommended delegation of the authority to apply policies pertaining to security clearance of staff and clerical personnel will result in undesirable and dangerous division of responsibility, as well as in duplication and confusion in personnel investigative activities and maintenance of resultant records. As indicated in the preceding subparagraph, it has never been contemplated that the clearance policies heretofore contained in CIG Directive [redacted] would be applicable to

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operating (agent) personnel engaged in foreign intelligence activities. Only one agency in CIG should be responsible for the application of security clearance policies for all staff, clerical and consultant personnel, including foreign mission personnel who are engaged in directing and supervising the work of the field operators who will be "vetted" by mission heads or their authorized representatives.



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Acting Chief, Security Branch